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1.  INTRODUCTION
Researchers in the field of marketing consider coupons to be promotional devices that aim to
increase brand market share, strengthen brand loyalty, and expand a product’s market by attracting
consumers with low reservation prices.  Economists provide a complementary perspective by modeling
coupons as tools to exploit unilateral market power through price discrimination.  While both research
traditions demonstrate interest in the functions of coupons and their performance implications, the
determinants of coupon values have been largely unexplored.  Reasons for this deficiency in the literature
include a lack of sufficiently detailed transaction data and the proprietary nature of coupon information.
The objective of this study is to develop and test a model that identifies the factors that influence
coupon values at the brand level.  The theoretical framework is derived from price discrimination theory
and the principles of demand.  Couponing is considered within the context of a complex marketing
program in which it is coordinated with other non-price promotions such as advertising, store flyers, and
in-store displays.  In order to test the hypotheses of the model, the framework is operationalized with a
simultaneous, two-equation, fixed-effects, panel-data model and fitted with data on household purchases
of ready-to-eat (RTE) breakfast cereals.  The RTE cereal industry has been chosen because of its intense
use of couponing.
There are several reasons why it is important to know the determinants of coupon values.  First,
published theoretical and empirical research is not rigorous in identifying the factors that influence
discount levels.  While a handful of studies explicitly analyze subsets of the explanatory variables
(Gerstner, Hess, & Holthausen, 1994; Shaffer & Zhang, 1995; Nevo & Wolfram, 1999), most works only
hint at what the determinants may be.  As a result, previous research does not provide insights for brand
managers who are interested in understanding the factors that influence the face values of coupons.
1 
Second, there is concern that the discounts in some industries are at non-optimal levels (i.e., values that
do not maximize firm profitability or diminish welfare).  Knowledge about the significant determinants of3
coupon values can assist in the evaluation of financial or market performance.  Third, product prices and
coupon values are determined simultaneously.  If the face values of coupons are to be set correctly, then
the factors that affect both brand prices and discount levels must be identified and quantified with the
appropriate data.  Fourth, firms can increase sales with non-price strategies other than couponing.  Brand
managers need to understand how these other promotional activities affect discount levels (in terms of
direction and magnitude) so that they may adequately set the face values of coupons.
2.  FUNCTIONS OF COUPONS
Manufacturers offer coupons to achieve a number of goals, including attracting price-sensitive
consumers (Ward & Davis, 1978; Schindler, 1984), price discrimination (Narasimhan, 1984; Houston &
Howe, 1985), advertising products (Leone & Srinivasan, 1996; Capps, Seo, & Nichols, 1997), and
increasing or protecting brand market share (Neslin, 1990; Raju, Dahr, & Morrison, 1994; Shaffer &
Zhang, 1995).  Since companies cannot prevent individuals with high reservation prices from using
coupons, brand prices and discount levels should be set such that the leakage maximizes revenue (Larson,
1997).
2  Manufacturers also use coupons to obtain market research data from the clearinghouses that
process the discounts.
3  Moreover, coupons serve as a strategic tool within the distribution channel
(Gerstner & Hess, 1991).  Because distributors may not pass manufacturers’ price breaks downstream,
couponing circumvents compliance problems by placing the savings directly in the hands of consumers.
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3.  BACKGROUND ON THE RTE CEREAL INDUSTRY
In the early 1990s, RTE breakfast cereals were among the five most concentrated classes of food
products, and there has been recent consolidation in the RTE cereal market (Wall Street Journal, 1995;
Gibson, 1996; Miller, 1996b; Connor, 1999).  Today, four firms dominate the industry: Kellogg, General
Mills, Post, and Quaker.4
The RTE cereal industry may be characterized as a tight structural oligopoly.  It is generally
believed that the leading cereal makers avoid competing on the basis of price in order to prevent
destructive discounting practices that would erode firm profitability (Scherer, 1982).  However, that long-
standing practice was broken in April 1996.  Per capita consumption of branded cereals stagnated in the
early 1990s because of the rising differential between branded and private-label cereal prices (Price,
2000; Price & Connor, 2001).  Consumers were also switching to more portable foods such as bagels and
breakfast bars (Canedy & Abelson, 1999).  Post announced that it would slash its cereals’ prices by 20
percent so that it could reduce the company’s dependence on inefficient promotional activities, namely
couponing (Gibson & Ono, 1996).  Two months later, the other major producers, including Kellogg and
General Mills, stated that they would follow suit by cutting a portion of their brands’ prices (Miller,
1996a; Balu, 1998a).  A simultaneous reduction in the number and face values of coupons lowered the
benefits of the price cuts for those consumers who redeemed the discounts.
5
Although RTE cereal manufacturers rarely compete on the basis of price, rivalry does arise
through a variety of non-price strategies.  In the early 1990s, couponing was the predominant vehicle for
product promotion.  More than 44 billion coupons were issued for breakfast cereals in 1993, which cost
manufacturers approximately 17 to 20 percent of industry sales revenue.
6  Furthermore, the major cereal
makers spend 10 to 15 percent of the value of their sales on mass-media advertising to differentiate
brands, reduce product substitutability, and create demand segments in the market (Connor, 1999).  This
strategy limits the market penetration of potential entrants and private-label cereal manufacturers.  Intense
advertising also raises the minimum level of promotional activity that is required for new entrants to have
successful product introductions.
Because of high market concentration, barriers to entry, and non-price rivalry, the RTE cereal
industry enjoyed extraordinarily high profitability up until the mid-1990s.
7  Moreover, the margin
between cereal prices and manufacturing costs increased dramatically in the 1970s, 1980s, and the first5
half of the 1990s.  The difference, known as the price-cost margin (PCM), is approximated with data from
the cereal breakfast foods industry, which includes RTE cereal manufacturers as well as the makers of
infant and hot cereals (e.g., oatmeal).  In 1995, the RTE cereal industry’s PCM was 0.75, up from 0.46 in
1973 (Price, 2000).
8  Recently, high prices for branded cereals and consumers’ increasing preference for
portable breakfast foods have made it difficult for RTE cereal companies to maintain their previous
success.  While the dominant cereal makers announced price and discount cuts in 1996 to stimulate
waning consumer demand and increase firm profitability, the results were disappointing (Balu, 1998b).
4.  THEORETICAL MODEL
Assume that there is a market for a particular type of good with two sellers and two distinct
submarkets.  Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the brands that are produced by the firms.  The
manufacturers compete directly and indirectly with each other through product formulation and demand
positioning.  As a result, all of the brands are substitutes to some degree.  Brands in a given submarket are
either strong or moderate substitutes because of product similarity.  For example, brands A-II-A and     
A-II-B are similar to each other and to the brands produced by Firm B in Segment II.  The most intense
rivalry arises when firms imitate product formulations and create similar images for a pair of brands.  In
figure 1, Firm A competes directly with Firm B by making brand A-I-A with attributes that are nearly
identical to those of brand B-I-A and advertising it to the same set of consumers.  Direct competition is
denoted by bold arrows in figure 1.  Product design differences within a particular segment ensure less
intense rivalry between brands (for example, brand A-II-B with brands A-II-A and B-II-A).  The thin
lines between products indicate moderate substitutability.  Brands in different submarkets are
competitively the most insulated from one another (i.e., weak substitutes).
It is assumed that consumers repeatedly purchase their favorite brands.  Product differentiation
creates varying degrees of brand loyalty in consumers.  Depending on an individual’s preferences, a6
person either greatly or weakly prefers one brand over the others in his/her favorite category.  Those
individuals who greatly prefer their products are assumed to be brand loyal and have a high reservation
price for their goods.  Loyal consumers are expected to be relatively price insensitive.  That is, they
require more compensation to switch brands than nonloyal consumers.  Nonloyal consumers display the
opposite characteristics. 
All brands are assumed to be purchased by loyal and nonloyal consumers.  The market may be
thought of as monopolistically competitive where each brand is horizontally differentiated.  Therefore, the
consumers’ demand curves for their favorite brands are downward-sloping and fairly elastic.  The demand
curve of a single loyal consumer for brand i is denoted as D
L
i in figure 2.  A representative nonloyal
consumer’s demand curve is labeled as D
N
i in the same figure.  The retail price of brand i is P
R
i , and the
vertical intercepts indicate the two consumers’ reservation prices.  The loyal consumer has a reservation
price of P
L
i for good i, but the nonloyal individual is not willing to pay more than P
N
i for that brand.  Each
person’s demand function for his/her preferred brand is assumed to be specified by either
(1)     Q
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i indicate the quantities
demanded of brand i by a single loyal consumer and nonloyal consumer, respectively.  The term BLi
denotes the level of loyalty to brand i.  The prices of rival brands are represented by P
R
-i , and C-i signifies
the size of discounts for competing brands.
The firms are assumed to price discriminate against their own loyal and nonloyal consumers in
each submarket.  The manufacturer of brand i maximizes the profit from the loyal purchasers of that item
by charging them the product’s full retail price, P
R
i .  (For simplicity, it is assumed that no retailers or7
wholesalers are involved in the distribution and marketing chain.)  The firm also offers coupons for brand
i with a value of Ci .  The coupons lower the item’s effective price for those who redeem the discounts,
and the reduced price (P
R
i - Ci) maximizes the profit from the nonloyal demand segment.  Both P
R
i and Ci
are set so as to allow for leakage.  While P
R



















i and the coupons make brand i affordable for
at least some of the nonloyal consumers who prefer that product.
There are costs associated with using coupons.  Consumers must find, clip, sort, save, and redeem
the discounts in order to accrue the savings denoted by the face values.  The consumers are assumed to
have transaction costs that are randomly distributed among both types of individuals.
9  That is, some
consumers have transaction costs equal to tj while others have either higher or lower transaction costs. 
Whether or not a person redeems the discount for his/her favorite brand depends critically on the level of





i), the manufacturers cannot prevent them from utilizing the discounts.  Loyal
consumers use their preferred brands’ discounts if their transaction costs are less than or equal to the
products’ coupon values.  That is, loyal consumers with transaction costs tj redeem brand i’s coupons
when tj  Ci .  Nonloyal individuals with the same transaction costs purchase the product if




In other words, the face value must be large enough to offset the nonloyal consumers’ transaction costs
and still have enough left over to reduce the price paid to or below their reservation price.  Some nonloyal
consumers remain out of the market when (3) does not hold.
It is important to discuss one limitation of the model.  Some retailers double or triple the face
values of manufacturer-issued coupons (usually discounts of 50 cents or less) in order to encourage
consumers to shop at their stores.  While brand managers set the face values of coupons, the true savings8
realized by consumers may be much greater if retailer doubling or tripling occurs.  With additional
discounts from retailers, more nonloyal individuals find that their preferred brands are affordable and
greater leakage occurs in the loyal consumer segment.  Because retailers are not considered in the
theoretical framework, the effect of coupon doubling or tripling on the net prices paid is not captured in
this study.
The first step in understanding the factors that influence the face values of coupons is to analyze
the relationship between P
R





i + tj .  It is argued that to just induce the nonloyal consumers with transaction costs tj to
purchase brand i, the previous expression holds with equality.  That is,





The partial derivative Ci / P
R
i reveals that there is a direct relationship between P
R
i and Ci .  Considering
the inequality, a change in the discount level must be greater than or equal to any price increase if the
nonloyal consumers are to continue purchasing brand i.
Brand loyalty, the prices of competing brands, and rival couponing also affect the size of the
discount for brand i.  Changes in these variables shift the nonloyal consumers’ demand curves and alter
their reservation price.
10  Therefore,







Using (4) and (5), the effect of a change in the nonloyal consumers’ loyalty on brand i’s discount,        
Ci / BL
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i).  The expression in the second set of parentheses is
positive since an increase in brand loyalty causes the nonloyal consumers’ demand curves to shift to the
right as shown in figure 3 for a representative individual.  The sign of the first expression is negative
assuming that the nonloyal consumers’ new reservation price, P
N




i .  The inverse
relationship between P
N
i and Ci exists because a smaller discount is needed (after the shift in demand) to9
induce the nonloyal consumers to purchase brand i.  The net effect of an increase in the nonloyal
consumers’ loyalty on brand i’s coupon value is negative.
  Lower prices and larger discounts for rival brands increase the attractiveness of those items and
shift a nonloyal consumer’s demand curve to the left (figure 4).  Using (4) and (5) again,                            
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-i is positive.  Therefore, Ci / P
R
-i is negative, indicating that
targeted firms increase the discounts on their own goods as rival products become cheaper.  The
expression Ci / C-i is positive, showing that firms raise the price concessions on their own brands when
rival manufacturers try to lure their customers away with competing discounts (as proposed by Shaffer &
Zhang, 1995).  Both reactions are intended to protect the targeted firms’ sales.
Brand market share (MSi) is also thought to influence discount levels.  Manufacturers are
assumed to use coupons as share-maintenance tools (Price, 1999).  Therefore, a positive relationship
between brand market share and discount levels is expected.  Hedonic pricing studies (e.g., Stanley &
Tschirhart, 1991) have shown that brand-specific characteristics (BSCi) influence product prices.  Since
discount levels and brand prices are intimately related, product attributes are expected to affect discount
levels (either positively or negatively) as well.
Most companies do not strictly rely on one non-price promotion to bolster sales and compete with
rivals.  In fact, many manufacturers have complex marketing programs in which non-price promotions are
substituted for each other or combined in various proportions.  Because there are tradeoffs and synergies
between non-price promotions, adjustments in the mix of these marketing strategies can influence coupon
values.  Thus, it is important to consider the effects of other non-price promotions on discount levels.
Firms may choose to employ intense advertising campaigns (ADi) to market a given brand rather
than offer large coupon discounts to induce purchases.  Thus, an inverse relationship between those two
promotional activities is expected.  Brand managers may also coordinate coupon drops with retail-level10
campaigns.  In-store displays (DISPLAYi) catch consumers’ attention and pique their interest in the
promoted product, potentially leading to impulse purchases without coupon redemptions.  As a result, in-
store displays may reduce the need for large discounts.  The issuance of coupons may also be
synchronized with store flyers  (PRINTi) that feature products on a rotating basis.  Many times, these
flyers are included in Sunday newspapers, which also contain manufacturer-issued coupons.  Due to the
physical proximity of the promotions to each other, store flyers may prompt some consumers to clip the
coupons in the free-standing inserts, thus raising redemption rates.  Moreover, manufacturers may attempt
to increase the probability of usage by offering coupons with relatively large face values.  Therefore, a
positive relationship may arise between the use of store ads and the size of the discount for a particular
good.  To summarize, the following expression depicts the determinants of brand coupon values:
        . (6)
Economic theory indicates that brand prices and discount levels influence each other.  In order to
account for the bi-directional causality between Ci and P
R
i , the determinants of P
R
i need to be identified. 
While brand managers probably set prices first before calculating the associated discounts, coupon values
that are deemed to be too large or too small may be altered to achieve a particular effect on sales. 
Changes in discount levels may force managers, in turn, to adjust brand prices in order to maintain a
certain relationship between the two variables.
Larger discounts, when redeemed, result in increased costs for firms, which must be accounted
for in higher brand prices.  Besides Ci , P
R
i is influenced by the prices of competing brands, costs of
production, advertising expenditures, inventory levels, and brand-specific effects.  That is,
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The variables MATi , LABi , and Ei are the material, labor, and energy costs associated with producing
brand i, respectively, and INVi is the quantity of brand i held in inventory.  Increasing costs of production
and advertising expenditures are expected have a positive influence on P
R
i because a higher brand price is
needed to cover rising costs (Wills & Mueller, 1989).  Higher inventory levels, on the other hand, are
thought to negatively affect P
R
i because the manufacturer must lower brand i’s price to reduce unexpected
build-up of stocks.  Together, (6) and (7) comprise the behavioral model in this study.
5.  APPLICATION TO THE RTE CEREAL INDUSTRY
The theoretical model is employed to identify the determinants of coupon discounts for RTE
breakfast cereals.  The RTE cereal industry has been chosen because of its intense use of couponing. 
RTE cereal makers have traditionally employed several non-price promotions to market their brands to
consumers.  Therefore, the behavioral model represented by (6) and (7) most accurately depicts the
industry’s pricing and marketing behavior.
The prepared cereal market is assumed to comprise four submarkets: regular or adult cereals,
presweetened brands, cereals containing fruit and/or nuts, and granolas (these segments are similar to
those chosen by Nevo & Wolfram, 1999).
11  Researchers and industry analysts generally agree that RTE
cereals may be divided into regular and presweetened brands.  Granolas may be considered a separate
submarket since they have a natural, healthy image.  Furthermore, their heft and firm texture distinguish
them from other cereals.  Brands that contain fruit and/or nuts may constitute an independent group
because the other cereal types do not offer these ingredients, which may provide a more nutritious and
complete meal.
RTE cereals have brand-specific characteristics that influence their prices and coupon values. 
Evidence suggests that presweetened brands as a group are discounted less than other kinds of cereal. 
With most presweetened cereals being consumed by children, parents are likely to indulge their children12
and be relatively unconcerned about whether presweetened brands are discounted with coupons (Connor,
1997).  When adults purchase regular cereals for their own consumption, they may be more price and
coupon sensitive.  It is believed that the average brand loyalty to fruit/nut and granola cereals is high. 
Thus, the coupon values for these brands may be larger than the discounts for regular and presweetened
cereals in order to encourage switching among brands.  Product prices and coupon values are also
assumed to be influenced by other brand-specific characteristics.  These attributes include cereal texture
(e.g., flaked, puffed, or shredded), grain type, nutritional content, and the length of availability on store
shelves (i.e., whether a particular brand is established or relatively new).
6.  EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
Expressions (6) and (7) were operationalized with the following simultaneous, two-equation, fixed-
effects, panel-data model:
(8a)
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i and Ci are the retail price of and average redeemed discount for cereal i in dollars per pound,
respectively.
12  Redeemed, manufacturer-issued coupons (excluding additional discounts from retailer
doubling or tripling) were preferred to those that are simply offered because they must be used in order
for the firms to realize their price discriminatory and competitive goals.  Discounts that are issued but
never redeemed by nonloyal individuals are, for the most part, wasteful from the firms’ perspective.
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The variable BLi is a measure of consumer loyalty to cereal i and is defined as the share of sales13
volume that a particular brand represents among the buyers of RTE cereal.  Although the theoretical
model specifies the inclusion of the nonloyal consumers’ brand loyalty, such data were unavailable. 
Therefore, the loyalty of all consumers who purchase brand i was used as a proxy.
14  The term C-i is the
weighted average discount that is redeemed for cereals that compete with brand i (i.e., those cereals that
are in the same submarket as brand i) in dollars per pound.  The weight used to calculate C-i is brand
market share relative to the appropriate submarket.  Similar to C-i , P
R
-i in 8b is the weighed average price
(dollars per pound) of rival cereals in the same submarket as brand i.
15  Brand market share, MSi , is the
percentage market share held by brand i in the entire RTE cereal market.
The intensity of mass-media advertising for a given brand (ADi) is measured in millions of
dollars per pound of cereal purchased in a sample of 1,000 households.  The percentage of brand sales
that is accompanied with in-store displays is denoted by DISPLAYi .  The term PRINTi is the percentage
of brand i’s sales that occurs when the product is featured in newspaper advertisements or store flyers
(either mailed to customers’ homes or distributed at stores).
The firm-year dummy variables POST96, GM96, and KEL96 indicate the brands that were
produced by Post, General Mills, and Kellogg in 1996, respectively.  These variables were included in the
model to capture the firms’ slashing of cereal prices and coupon values that year.  The term NEWEXP96
denotes the brands that were available for purchase in 1996 but were either introduced or discontinued
during the study period (1992 to 1997).  It is expected that new and expiring cereals do not compete
intensively with established brands.  Recent introductions, regardless of the prices and discounts for older
brands, are highly couponed in order to generate trials with first-time purchasers.  Unpopular cereals, on
the other hand, are not heavily discounted because companies tend to concentrate on promoting more
profitable brands.  Given the competitive insulation of new and expiring brands, the RTE cereal
industry’s price and discount cuts are expected to have only applied to established cereals.  In other
words, the prices of and discounts for new and expiring cereals are not expected to have been14
significantly lower in 1996.
The data used to quantify the variables in (8a) [except for ADi] as well as P
R
-i in (8b) were
obtained from the Marketing Fact Book (IRI, 1997 and previous years).  The report provides annual,
aggregate information on household purchases of 82 RTE cereals between 1992 to 1997.
16  Purchase data
from more than 180 grocery stores (including major retail chains and small, independent establishments)
were recorded in 27 markets across the United States using identification cards that were issued to
consumers and scanned at the time of checkout.  Computers kept track of purchased volumes and the
prices paid by consumers, with IRI staff verifying all coupon redemptions.  Only the brands that attained
a market share of at least 0.5 percent in the entire RTE cereal market are reported by IRI.  Brand totals
include all package sizes, although different flavors are listed separately.  The RTE cereal makers
included in this study are Kellogg, General Mills, Post, Quaker, Nabisco, Malt-O-Meal, Ralston, Health
Valley, Kashi, and private-label manufacturers.  The data source does have some limitations in that it
does not include sales at non-grocery outlets (e.g., convenience stores and gas stations), products without
bar codes, and non-scannable items.  However, these limitations are unlikely to significantly affect the
data on RTE cereal purchases.  Advertising expenditures, which cover expenses in 10 major media
outlets, including magazines, newspapers, radio, and television, were taken from Ad $ Summary (Leading
National Advertisers, 1997 and previous years) and divided by sales volume (obtained from IRI, 1997 and
previous years).
The cost of food ingredients and packaging materials associated with the production of brand i
(MATi) is represented by an index.
17  Inputs were separated into grains (wheat, rice, corn, oats, and
barley), sugar, oil, nuts, dried fruit, paperboard boxes, and plastic bags, according to a list of primary
inputs in the Census of Manufactures (U.S. Census Bureau, 1992).  The amounts of the various food
ingredients (in percentage terms) were chosen based on cereal type (Price, 1999).  Annual producer price
indexes for the commodities and packaging materials were gathered from the U.S. Bureau of Labor15
Statistics (1999).  The material cost index for a given brand was computed by adding together the food-
ingredient cost index (obtained by multiplying the food ingredients’ percentages by the respective
producer price indexes and summing up all of the values) and the price indexes for boxes and bags.  Some
brands (Malt-O-Meal’s entire product line and a few of Quaker’s cereals) were bagged only.  For those
cereals, the price index for folding paperboard boxes was excluded from the material cost index.
The term LAB is payroll in thousands of dollars per employee and INV is the total value of
inventories (including materials, work in progress, and finished goods) in millions of dollars in the cereal
breakfast foods industry, respectively.  Industry-level data on labor costs and inventory levels was
obtained from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (U.S. Census Bureau, 1998 and previous years) and the
Census of Manufactures (U.S. Census Bureau, 1992).
18
7.  RESULTS
Equations (8a) and (8b), which depict the RTE cereal makers’ complex pricing and marketing
strategies, were estimated with two-stage least squares in order to account for the endogeneity of brand
prices, discount levels, and brand market share.
19  Autocorrelation was not detected in either (8a) or (8b),
but heteroskedasticity was corrected in both equations.  The coefficients and t-statistics associated with
the time-variant regressors are presented in tables 1 and 2.
Nevo and Wolfram (1999) also examined the relationship between cereal prices and coupon
values, and their findings differ from those of this study.  While a different time period (1989 to 1992),
fewer brands (25), the use of face values rather than redeemed discounts, and more disaggregated data
(quarterly information from 65 cities) contribute to the discrepancies, the differences between the studies
are due primarily to Nevo and Wolfram’s (1999) use of a large number of dummy variables.  These
variables, which capture changes in manufacturers’ costs and consumer demand as well as differences in
time and geographic location, explain virtually all of the variation in cereal prices.  Therefore, the16
reported relationship between coupon values and the residual variation in shelf prices only focuses on a
small component of price variation.  In contrast, this study’s framework explicitly includes demand
factors and manufacturers’ costs in separate equations for coupon values and cereal prices.
The fit of this study’s model is excellent with 83 and 96 percent of RTE cereal discounts and
prices, respectively, being explained by the independent variables.  Many of the variables in the brand-
price and coupon-value equations are statistically    significant, thus supporting a number of hypotheses
proposed in this study.  The significance of P
R
i and Ci at the 95 percent confidence level supports the
contention that cereal prices and discount levels simultaneously influence each other.  It is also evident
that RTE cereal manufacturers price discriminate against consumers.  Larger discounts are offered when
brand prices rise in order to keep the nonloyal consumers in the market.  Interestingly, according to the
coefficient of P
R
i in table 1, redeemed discounts only rose 12.2¢ per pound for every $1-per-pound
increase in cereal prices in the early and mid-1990s.  This unequal change likely forced some nonloyal
consumers to stop buying their favorite brands because they were no longer affordable.  The exodus of
nonloyal consumers from the breakfast cereal market may have been sufficiently large to cause the cereal
industry’s lackluster performance during that period.  One potential strategy that may improve their
financial condition is to equalize changes in prices and discount levels.  In contrast, Nevo and Wolfram
(1999) found that cereal prices are negatively correlated with discount size.  The authors concluded that
RTE cereal makers do not use coupons primarily as price-discriminatory tools.  Instead, other factors,
such as the strategic interaction between firms, influence the relationship between cereal prices and
coupon values.
The findings support the hypothesis that RTE cereal manufacturers employ complex marketing
campaigns when promoting their products to consumers.  Couponing is synchronized with and substituted
for other non-price promotions.  Couponing and advertising are strong substitutes in the RTE cereal
industry.  More intense advertising campaigns make consumers aware of product attributes and encourage17
trial or repeat purchases, reducing the need for issuing large discounts.  When advertising expenditures
increased by $1 million per pound of cereal purchased in the 1990s, redeemed discounts fell by 32.7¢ per
pound.  The non-price promotions DISPLAYi and PRINTi are statistically significant, suggesting that
cereal makers coordinate couponing with these promotional vehicles.
20  The use of in-store displays
lowers the average redeemed discount for a brand because they cause impulse purchases without coupon
usage.  Moreover, the average redeemed discount for a given brand is higher when more sales are made
when the product is featured in store flyers.  This finding implies that coupon drops are timed with retail
promotions to encourage cereal purchases as well as the redemption of discounts.
Consistent with Shaffer and Zhang (1995), brand loyalty is a critical variable that cereal makers
take into account when setting the face values of coupons.  During the 6-year period, cereal makers
reduced discounts an average of 5.3¢ per pound for every one-unit increase in the brand loyalty index. 
The outcome of MSi supports the hypothesis that RTE cereal producers issue coupons to maintain brand
market share.  In the mid-1990s, a one-percentage-point difference in brand market share caused the
average redeemed discount to vary by 27.4¢ per pound.
The variable C-i is strongly significant and reinforces the contention that cereal manufacturers
rely on couponing to compete with each other.  When cereal makers offer large discounts to entice the
purchasers of rival cereals to switch brands, the targeted firms retaliate with greater price concessions. 
This measure helps to prevent the erosion of the targeted firms’ sales.  According to table 1, companies
raised the discounts for their own brands by 56.4¢ per pound when the weighted average discount
redeemed for rival cereals increased by $1 per pound.  The coefficient of C-i provides empirical support
for Shaffer and Zhang’s (1995) hypothesis that companies use coupons to lure consumers away from their
competitors.  The importance of inter-firm rivalry with respect to couponing was also stressed by Nevo
and Wolfram (1999); the authors found that coupons are more likely to accompany shelf price
concessions when rivals coupon their own products.18
In table 2, discount levels are an important factor that affect brand prices, thus agreeing with
Narasimhan (1984) and Gerstner, Hess, and Holthausen (1994).  Larger discounts represent increased
costs for cereal makers, which must be accounted for in higher brand prices.  However, changes in
redeemed discount levels exceeded those of brand prices in the 1990s, indicating that this marketing
strategy left price-sensitive consumers better off during that time.  Relatively large discounts may cause
the leakage segment to expand, and some loyal consumers may leave the market due to the higher brand
prices (i.e., if  P
R
i rises above P
L
i and they do not redeem the coupons).  This strategy may not be optimal
and may have contributed to the firms’ financial decline.  Cereal companies may be able to improve their
performance by better equating the changes in prices and discount levels.
In table 2, P
R
-i is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.  The coefficient of this
variable is interpreted as the average change in breakfast cereals’ prices when the weighted average price
of rival brands rises by $1 per pound.  Between 1992 and 1997, cereal prices rose 70.3¢ per pound for
every $1-per-pound increase in the prices of competing brands.  Although near price equality may
indicate either a competitive market environment or imperfect collusion, company executives’ statements
seem to support the latter scenario (Scherer, 1982).
Food-ingredient and packaging costs are important factors that influence RTE cereal prices.  In
the early and mid-1990s, brand prices increased an average of 1.6¢ per pound for every 10-unit increase
in the material cost index.  Given the importance of advertising in RTE cereal promotions, it is not
surprising that mass-media advertising expenditures have a strong, positive influence on cereal prices.  An
additional $1 million in advertising expenditures per pound of cereal sold caused brand prices to rise by
80.0¢ per pound in the mid-1990s.  In a previous study, Wills and Mueller (1989) found that advertising
has a positive and significant positive impact on brand-level food prices in 133 product categories.  
Cereal makers are concerned about inventory levels.  Although breakfast cereals are not highly
perishable like fresh meat or milk, they tend to become stale if not consumed within several months after19
production.  As anticipated, manufacturers lower brand prices to reduce the unexpected build-up of
stocks.  Employee wages (LAB) are not a significant determinant of cereal prices, but the aggregate data
used to quantify the variable may have affected the magnitude of the coefficient.  In addition, some of the
top cereal makers, including Kellogg, attempted to reduce costs by laying off employees, closing plants,
and forcing wage concessions during the study period (Gibson, 1995).  Declines in wages may have offset
any pay increases, leading to an insignificant relationship between the two variables.
Many of the brand-specific effects in the price and coupon-value equations are statistically
significant.  Therefore, cereal type (i.e., regular/adult, presweetened, fruit/nut, or granola) and other
product attributes affect brand prices as well as discount levels.  This finding reaffirms Stanley and
Tschirhart’s (1991) conclusion that brand-specific effects influence cereal prices.
Post’s 1996 price cuts were statistically significant, thus supporting published news articles that
the company dropped its cereals’ prices to reduce the company’s reliance on inefficient promotional
activities, namely couponing (Gibson & Ono, 1996).  The company’s discounts were also found to be
lower that year.  The coefficients of POST96 in the two equations underestimate the actual price and
discount reductions because the company’s 1996 cereal prices and discount were compared with those in
all other years in the study period, not just those in late 1995 and early 1996.  Only General Mills’ price
cuts were significant that year.  The coefficient of GM96 in table 2 may overestimate the actual price
reduction because only a portion of its brands were discounted in 1996 and it incorporates the firm’s price
cuts from May 1994 (Holusha, 1994).  The prices for Kellogg’s cereals in 1996 were not different from
those in other years even though the firm announced that it would slash half of its cereals’ prices by 19
percent.  Since the coefficient of KEL96 in table 1 suggests that the company’s coupon values were, on
average, 2.5¢ per pound higher than in other years, Kellogg may have altered its price-discounting
strategy from one that was general (which could be taken advantage of by all consumers) to one that was
targeted.  By increasing discount levels, Kellogg would be able to offer price concessions to a specific20
group of consumers, namely the price-sensitive individuals.
New and expiring brands’ prices and discounts were significantly lower in 1996.  This result was
not expected since those kinds of cereal were thought to be somewhat insulated from competition. 
Discounts for new cereals were assumed to be high regardless of the coupon values for similar, establish
brands because the makers of new cereals want to generate interest among potential first-time purchasers. 
Expiring brands, on the other hand, were thought to have waning demand because they have fallen out of
favor with consumers.  Companies were expected to concentrate on promoting more profitable brands and
treat unpopular cereals as “cash cows.”
21  Instead, it appears that the manufacturers of new and expiring
brands dropped the prices of and discounts for those cereals in order to prevent a precipitous decline in
sales that would have been caused by potentially large premiums above the net prices for established
cereals.
8.  CONCLUSIONS
While the companies blame coupons for their poor performance, it appears that the firms’
predicament may be due to the incorrect mix of pricing and couponing activities.  Either discounts are too
large or price-sensitive consumers are priced out of the market when changes in brand prices exceed those
of discount levels.  Coordinating pricing and couponing strategies  may improve the companies’ situation.
Although there are many facets of couponing that can influence profitability, marketing directors
may also be able to alleviate some of the pressures on firm performance by quantifying the significant
variables highlighted in this study to calculate more appropriate coupon values.  For example, brand
loyalty was found to be an important determinant of discount levels.  If consumers’ loyalty to a certain
cereal is determined to be higher than originally thought, then, all else being equal, marketing managers
should lower that product’s coupon discount because many consumers will continue to buy the cereal
even with a smaller savings.21
Managers in the RTE cereal industry should be aware that the presence of price discrimination
and near symmetry of prices can be detected empirically.  While these pricing tactics have undesirable
welfare consequences, conscious parallelism in pricing is, by and large, legal so long as it is not the result
of overt agreements.  However, if such pricing practices are combined with evidence of intent to enhance
market power, the conduct could be actionable under United States antitrust laws.
Before any action is taken against the RTE cereal industry, regulators should take into account
one other finding of this study.  Even if cereal manufacturers price discriminate and do not price
independently, they are rivalrous with respect to couponing.  Firms encourage brand switching and
protect market shares with large discounts.  Any proposed antitrust remedy to change pricing practices
must consider these strategies of the leading RTE cereal companies.  Furthermore, policy restraints that
focus exclusively on the problems of noncompetitive pricing and price discrimination are likely to have
unintended consequences for couponing behavior due to the intimate relationship between brand prices
and discount levels.22
FOOTNOTES
1 Brand managers are also interested in other aspects of couponing including ad size, distribution method
(e.g., free-standing inserts in newspapers, on-pack discounts, and shelf displays), the scope of circulation,
the number of products required for discount eligibility, issue dates, and the validity period.
2 According to Larson (1997), losses may result if leakage occurs after companies expect that demand
segments are sealed (i.e., no leakage occurs) and the firms do not adjust brand prices and discount levels
accordingly.
3 Some large companies such as Proctor & Gamble and General Mills operate their own clearinghouses. 
Due to the large number of coupons that are issued and redeemed, it is more cost effective for those firms
to process their own coupons than to pay a third party to perform the task.
4 Other methods of addressing the principal-agent problem include the use of on-pack coupons and
distributing discounts through on-shelf dispensers.
5 Although reducing the number of coupons issued does not lower the face values, consumers may view
such action as lowering the benefits of coupons.  Discounts may be more difficult to locate, thus lowering
the total price reduction that individuals may realize in a given time period.
6 Couponing in the RTE cereal industry is expensive because the firms incur costs beyond the total dollar
value of the redeemed discounts.  While the total redemption value of breakfast cereal coupons was $915
million in 1993, manufacturers spent an additional $300 million to $400 million on the printing,
distribution, and handling of the discounts that year.
7 According to Cotterill (1999), industry profits averaged 17 percent of sales revenue in the 1980s and the
first half of the 1990s.  The RTE cereal industry’s performance was so phenomenal that the Federal Trade
Commission filed an antitrust lawsuit against several firms in 1972 (Scherer, 1982).  General Mills,
Kellogg, General Foods (later known as Post), and Quaker (eventually dropped from the suit in 1978)
were charged with monopolizing the market through highly effective tacit collusion and not competing on
the basis of price.  After nearly 10 years of lobbying and litigation, the companies were exonerated by an
administrative law judge.
8 The dominant RTE cereal producers have relatively low food-ingredient costs (9 percent of sales
revenue in 1992, down from 23 percent in 1954).  Expenses for packaging (cardboard boxes and plastic
or foil bags) exceed those for food ingredients (Connor, 1999).  The cereal industry’s PCM was
significantly less in 1996.  The sudden drop was primarily due to the industry-wide price cuts which
occurred in April and June of that year.
9 It is assumed that the degree of an individual’s loyalty to his/her preferred brand does not influence the
level of the person’s transaction costs.
10 Because loyal consumers have strong brand preferences, it is assumed that their loyalty is constant. 
Thus, changes in rival brands’ prices and coupon discounts do not shift those individuals’ demand curves.23
11 Cereals that were categorized as either regular or presweetened follow the segmentation in the
Marketing Fact Book (Information Resources, Inc. [IRI], 1993).  Granolas and brands that contain fruit
and/or nuts are typically denoted by the products’ names (such as Kellogg’s Low Fat Granola, General
Mills’ Raisin Nut Bran, and Post’s Fruit & Fibre).  For those brands that do not have obvious titles (e.g.,
General Mills’ Basic 4), the cereals were located on store shelves to verify their ingredients.
12 All dollar variables are in nominal terms.  Dollar values were not deflated due to low inflation during
the study period.
13 Coupons may have a positive benefit even when they are not redeemed.  The advertising effect of
discounts can make consumers aware of product availability and increase the potential of purchase
without redemption. 
14 According to IRI, the developer of the indicator, the non-negative index is a good measure of brand loyalty
because the number and volume of cereal purchases are large enough to allow a loyalty pattern to emerge.
15 The prices of rival brands were excluded as an explanatory variable in (8a) due to the near price
equality among similar RTE cereals.
16 Two of the cereals are in aggregate: all private-label brands and those cereals that were available for
purchase in 1996 but were either introduced or discontinued during the six-year period.
17 Energy costs were not included as an explanatory variable in (8b) because they are a negligible portion
of total production costs in the cereal breakfast foods industry.  For example, using data from the Annual
Survey of Manufactures (U.S. Census Bureau, 1995), fuel and electricity costs were 3.4 percent of
material costs and 0.7 percent of the total value of industry shipments in 1995.
18 Use of information from the cereal breakfast foods industry is acceptable because its specialization and
coverage ratios indicate that the industry is well-defined by the Standard Industry Classification system.
19 Brand market share was considered to be endogenous because cereal makers can issue coupons to
increase their brands’ market shares in addition to using them as share-maintenance tools.  The Spencer-
Berk test was employed to verify the exogeneity of C-i , ADi , DISPLAYi , PRINTi , and P-i (Kmenta, 1986).
20 Although annual data were employed in the estimation of the empirical model, it is possible to make
general conclusions about the coordination and substitution of non-price promotions.  In store displays
and store flyers feature products on a rotating basis.  Several weeks may pass between when a given item
is promoted.  Similarly, coupons are not issued every week for the same product.  Instead, firms offer
coupons with a specific validity period and may wait several months before initiating subsequent
campaigns.  Thus, if a significant relationship appears between redeemed coupon values and other non-
price promotions, it is probably because the activities overlap.  If the promotions were not coordinated,
then no correlation would exist.  Advertising, on the other hand, is relatively constant when compared
with the use of store flyers and in-store displays.  In this case, the negative relationship between
advertising and coupon discounts is indicative of substitution rather than synchronization.
21 A cash cow is a declining brand that has reduced marketing support.  Manufacturers sometimes choose
this promotional strategy because the increase in short-run profits outweighs the cost of extending a
product’s life a few years through additional promotional expenditures.24
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2 (full equation) 0.8273
R
2 (brand-specific effects only) 0.6496
R
2 (time-variant variables only) 0.5672
* Significant at the 99 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).  Critical value is 2.326.
# Significant at the 95 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).  Critical value is 1.645.
† Significant at the 90 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).  Critical value is 1.282.

























2 (brand-specific effects only) 0.9179
R
2 (time-variant variables only) 0.3343
* Significant at the 99 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).  Critical value is 2.326.

































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.  Demand curves of a single nonloyal Figure 2.  Demand curves of a single loyal
consumer and nonloyal consumer with different levels of
consumer for brand i loyalty to brand i                                                       
                                                            
Figure 4.  Effect of lowering competing products’ prices or
increasing rival brands’ discounts on a nonloyal consumer’s
demand curve